Kurnyshova Y. The Berlin crisis 1958-1963 and U.S. foreign policy

Українська версія

Thesis for the degree of Candidate of Sciences (CSc)

State registration number

0405U002124

Applicant for

Specialization

  • 07.00.02 - Всесвітня історія

16-05-2005

Specialized Academic Board

Д 26.001.20

Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

Essay

The main purpose of the thesis is to grasp the essential characteristics of U.S. policy regarding Berlin crisis 1958-1963 in context of USSR-USA confrontation. What was the origin of the Berlin crisis, how did Presidents D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy respond to Soviet initiatives on Berlin and, finally, how did prior Alliance commitments influence their basic approaches-are the main questions the author seeks for answers. During the Cold War Berlin was turned into an emblem of the U.S. role in Europe and of the special relationship with West Germany. There was the first terrible test: the Berlin crisis 1948-1949. It started the practice of U.S intervention into European affairs in the post-war world. It strengthened the american obligations to Europe as certain special mission. Consequences affected in ten years, during the second Berlin crisis 1958-1963, which was potentially one of the most dangerous disputes of the Cold War era. The essence of crisis was, that with a series of ultimatums which havebeen presented to the countries of the West and first of all the USA, Soviet Union demanded transformation of the Western Berlin into the free demilitarized city. The ultimate purpose of the USSR was consolidation of communistic positions in East Germany, elimination of the western enclave of the western Berlin from its territory, and also legitimation of existing division in Europe through the recognition of NDR by the western states. Besides, an opportunity Bundeswehr get an access to the nuclear weapons was additional cause of trouble for Moscow. The common feature of D. Eisenhower and J. Kennedy policy was that they did not consider reunification of Germany as possible close prospect. Instead of it, the German question has concentrated on preservation of the western rights in Berlin - military presence of the western countries there and the free access to the city. American approaches to the settlement of the Berlin crisis were transformed depending on the international situation and under influence of internal political circumstances. Many of the events of the 1958-1963 crisis - the Geneva foreign ministers' meetings, the Camp David talks, the U-2 affair that preceded the aborted Paris summit, the Kennedy - Khrushchev encounter at Vienna, the Wall crisis, and the tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie-are investigated on the base of newly declassified documents. In e course of these events USA demonstrated willingness to negotiate, but rejected all compromises, which concerned their vital interests. The factor of the nuclear weapon has played one of the key roles in formation of the American policy. It was widely used by USA and USSR both as a way of pressure upon the opponent, and the tool of restraint among allies. In the atmosphere created by explicit and implicit nuclear threats on both sides, world leaders feared that if such a scenario materialized, any miscalculation could trigger a military confrontation which might escalate to global war. It has kept crisis in peaceful frameworks.

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