Pasichnyk N. John F. Kennedy Administration and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

The main purpose of the thesis is to analyze the essential characteristics of U.S. policy regarding the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The basic aspects of the perception and evaluations of the central problems of the crisis by American senior government officials and the decision-making process in J. F. Kennedy Administration during the Cuban missile crisis have been studied. J. F. Kennedy Administration's precrisis policy toward Cuba have been analyzed. Administration's campaign of political, economic, psychological and clandestine operations to overthrow the Castro regime was unsuccessful. It didn't only gain it's main purpose, but resulted in strengthening the control held by the Castro government within country and Soviet-Cuba relations. Using the wide range of new documents, the author examines the functioning the group of J. F. Kennedy's advisers, officially termed the "ExComm" (Executive Committee of the National Security Council). During the first stage of the crisis, the ExComm played the crucial role in formulation of American policy. The character of the problem, created by Soviet deployment in Cuba, and possible course of action were analyzed on the meeting of this group. Among different alternatives J. F. Kennedy Administration chosen what was regarded as the middle course: a blockade (termed a "quarantine") to prevent the arrival of more missiles and to compel Soviet withdrawal of those already in Cuba. The factors, which influenced upon the Administration's choice, were: the considerations about possible Soviet response on American action and reaction of the Allies and Latin American country; need to avoid a nuclear conflict and the issue of Berlin. The factor of personality has also influenced decision-making process in J. F. Kennedy Administration. During the Cuban missile crisis president J. F. Kennedy was inclined to believe the arguments of those advisers, whom he especially trusted, for example, R. Kennedy, R. McNamara, T. Sorensen. Strategy and tactics, used by J. F. Kennedy Administration to resolve the crisis have been studied. J. F. Kennedy Administration used the flexible approach to the implementation of earlier agreed decisions, which were modified depending on the circumstances. American politics during the second week of the crisis was effective: USA succeed to meet it's main goal - withdrawal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba - and kept crisis in peaceful frameworks. The private channel of personal exchanges between the J. F. Kennedy and N. Khrushchev, suspended by the Soviet Ambassador A. Dobrynin and Attorney General R. Kennedy, has played great role in the settlement of the Cuban missile crisis. It helped to find the ground for the compromise, to work out a mutually acceptable framework for the crisis settlement and to avoid internal political problems for both leaders.