Stepanenko A. Standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal proceedings.

The thesis is the first comprehensive research in domestic science on the standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal proceedings based on international and European experience under the action of Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine 2012. The main theoretical issues of "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard are examined. It is argued that phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a part of more complex concept - standard of proof. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is a criminal standard of proof and has the following features: 1) variability of standard of proof, which is dependent upon the field of application and subject; 2) strong relation between standard and burden of proof; 3) it is a decision threshold for the subject of decision making which sets an evidential level (measure) for a fact to be considered as existent. It is stated that from "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard standpoint, credibility as the highest level of probability is the only purpose of proving. It is also justified that philosophical category of "truth" is not applicable in the area of criminal process as purpose of proving due to the vagueness of the term and the limitations and constraints of proving in criminal procedure. On the basis of analysis of key influential works main historical vectors of development and interpretation of "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard were unfolded: 1) rational (as a mean to overcome uncertainty) and 2) theological (as a mean to overcome "burden of sentencing"). It is justified that the standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" doesn't conflict with the concept of "inner conviction," but makes its psychological aspects more formal by answering the question on sufficiency of present evidence in order to make a criminal procedural decision. It is asserted that all criminal procedural court decisions are probabilistic in nature and thus inevitableness of judicial errors. These judicial errors may be distributed by setting "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. It is possible to argue that society (state) put greater weight to Type I errors (false convictions) than to Type II errors (false acquittals). Analysis of current criminal procedural legislation of Ukraine, and the practices of the European Court of Human Rights, permits the argument that leaving a civil action undecided by a criminal court, and thus giving an opportunity for civil claimant to file the same civil claim before another civil court, fits with the concept of standard of proof. Standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" could only be used in criminal proceedings to answer the ultimate question - whether the defendant is guilty or not. Though civil action is triggered because of criminal misconduct, the acquittal of the defendant is made on a criminal standard which is not applicable in civil trial and which is far higher than civil standard. Accordingly, the civil claimant has a right for compensation, as well as a right to file the same civil claim to the civil trial. Such a procedure is consistent with the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, and does not violate the presumption of innocence enshrined in the Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Theoretically justified proposals and changes to the Criminal Procedural Code of Ukraine in the sphere of enforcement of standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal proceedings are formulated.