The thesis deals with the complex philosophical interpretation of law functioning as the temporal-ontological phenomenon. The classical legal thought describes the law as the static integrity of the entities (ideas, norms, legal statutes). When we try to understand law as something more than the official set of rules, we have to go further. The philosophy of natural law proposes that law includes more norms, than official norms of the legal normativism. For example they can be laws of nature (naturalism), law, which is established by the God (or Gods) (religious understanding of law), law which is based on the nature of human being (anthropologic point of view), law of reason (rationalism) etc. The named philosophical directions, which accept some subjective presuppositions (belief in God, belief in the reasonable essence of Nature or human etc.) as the basis of law and its normativity could be marked as "legal subjectivism". In this case we have no questions about normativity of such law, because the simple belief in God, in Reason, in Nature puts away every doubt: why do we need to obey this law? Traditional classical legal philosophy intends to determine law as entity (Seiende - germ.) through the other entity - freedom, equality, justice. But the similar attempts are like an endless circle. In other words, the determination the one entity through another is the way to the infinity, to the necessity of the further determination ("what is law?" - "it is freedom", "what is freedom?" - "freedom is…" etc.). The second negative feature of the determination of law as entity through the other entity is so-called "legal nominalism", when the phenomenon of law loses its own unique content and turns into empty general concept, which marks the simple totality of the other entity ("Law is freedom, equality, justice…."). The third imperfection of the classical position is a dogmatic way of the certain entity's identification as legal. The legal status of the certain entity (norms, legal decisions and other legal objects) is not the result of the researches, but is the dogmatic presumption. The specific feature of the similar approach lies in the free choice of the researcher, when he chooses this or that entity as "law", as the object of researches, and doesn't think about criterions of its legal relevance, its "legal status" ("Rechtlichkeit"). At the same time, such "legal entity" as legal norm or court decision always has the possibility to turn into "Unlaw" (for example, in the case of the review of the court decision by the higher court). Equally, the status of the "legal irrelevant entity" at any time could be transformed into the "legal", for example, when one or another thing becomes "evidence", "object of the offence" etc. On the contrary, the author of this work understands law as a dynamic, processual event. The phenomenon of law is researched on the levels of the legal entity, Being of law (Being of the legal entity) and law Being. The methodological foundations of the similar approach are the ontological difference (between Being and entity) and postontological difference (between Being of the entity and Being as such). The unity of Being and time is called the Event (M. Heidegger), which is the modus of the existence of Being itself. Using the similar philosophical presuppositions as the foundations of the research, the author comes to the conclusion, that law Being expresses itself as traction or attraction, which exist between an action and its legal consequences. Law time presents itself as the horizon of the reasoning of law Being as discontinuity between the action and its legal consequences. The law event as a "turn", which turns everything to its "legal side" is the required origin of law Being. Thus law Being is the modus of the existence of the Being itself. The given description of the legal time makes possible to disclose law Being. Following Heidegger, Being "exists" as event (Ereignis). So law Being is the certain "modus of exist" of Being itself, when the last "exists" as "law Being". As Heidegger said, to the essence of the Being belongs "that, what were (past)" "that, what might to be (future)" and "that, what ought to be (presence)". So due to this statement it is reasonable to understand law Being as "inter-belonging" between the "has-beens", "possible" and "ought", as "attraction" which puts these three phenomena "to-gather". On the ontic level of the legal processes law Being reveals itself as attraction between the committed deed and its legal consequences. All that entity which was "caught up" by the law event at the same moment received legal modus of Being, the Being of the similar entity becomes legal Being. But at that time, when legal deed encounters its legal consequences, the temporal loop ties up, and law Being disappears; legal entity becomes "normal" again and reveals itself in its chemical, physical, economic and others modes of Being. So the main thesis of the temporal ontology of law is the grounding of that fact, that law originally "is" the law Being, i.e. "attraction" between the committed deed and its legal consequences, which "exists" in the horizon of the time of the law. Thus legal modus of the Being of the legal entity (idea, norm, thing, human being) is derived from the involvement in the law event.
