Melnyk V. The Epistemological Contents of Kant’s Conceptuality in the Transcendental Deduction of Categories.

The PhD thesis is dedicated to the analysis of the conceptuality of I. Kant’s “Transcendental Deduction of Categories”: §§13-27 of “Transcendental Analytics”, key section "Critique of Pure Reason". Both editions of this section were involved in the analysis - in the first (1781) and second (1787) editions of the “Critique of Pure Reason”. The study of these texts is at the heart of the PhD thesis, but it also draws on the broader context of Kant's transcendental idealism and Kant's epistemology. The main task of the enquiry is to conduct a consistent epistemological interpretation of the conceptuality of the key sections of the “Critique of Pure Reason”, in which Kant's transcendental theory of experience is built. The enquiry is positioned as being carried out at the junction of the history of philosophy and epistemology.