Sepetyi D. Interactionism as a direction of the contemporary philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem in the analytical prospect

The thesis provides philosophical analysis of the content and argumentative foundations of psychophysical interactionism in juxtaposition with other main directions in the philosophy of mind as alternative purported solutions to the mind-body problem. It analyses and develops the main lines of the argumentation in favour of the main positions that are foundational for interactionism: 1) the ontological fundamentality of consciousness, its irreducibility to the physical; 2) physical realism as the recognition of the existence of mind-independent physical reality to which human body and brain belong; 3) bilateral causal interaction between the conscious mind and the brain as part of physical reality. The main objections against the described positions are discussed, as well as the main replies to these objections that can be found in philosophical literature. The author proposes his synthesis and development of the main lines of defence of the foundational positions of interactionism.