The thesis is aimed to develop theoretical basis, methodology and methodical support for central bank independence ensuring. Dynamic and bibliometric analysis of scientific work on central bank independence showed the existence of 10 clusters of contextual dimension of its studying, as well as 10 most powerful international scientific schools that formed the basis of central bank independence research.
Integral assessment of central bank independence should combine the parameters of personal, functional, institutional and financial independence, that have to be aggregated taking into account weighting factors that reflect the hierarchical position of each parameter in the central bank independence system. Methodological basis of determining of the central bank independence optimal level in the context of ensuring price stability in the country is improved by justifying the form of functional dependence of inflation on the dynamics of central bank independence.
Theoretical and methodological support for substantiation of logical and structural relationships between independence and transparency of the central bank should be carried out by a systematic combination of types of analysis (trend and bibliometric) and its measurements (subject-chronological and content-contextual). This allowed to structure the scientific work by subjects (public interest and interest of scientists), the chronology of the activation of attention, the scale and direction of cross-sectoral research. Substantiation of the nature of causal links between independence and transparency (both in general and in financial stability reports) of the central bank by Granger causality testing of four hypotheses on unilateral / bilateral links between them with a three-year time lag allowed to establish that the studied connections are not universal and determined by basic rules of functioning of the central bank, but are defined by national specificity of formation of quality of its internal environment.
Methodology and methodological tools of determining the role of the national pattern of the central bank independence in achieving price stability is developed through a combination of cluster and panel regression analysis with random effects. This allowed identifying and describing the main patterns of formation of central bank independence, formalizing central bank independence influence to the level of inflation in terms of these patterns, to investigate the change in the potential for inflation regulation of the central bank in different scenarios of central bank independence.
The hypothesis that the influence of central bank independence on the dynamics of economic growth largely depends on the level of welfare of the population and is also manifested in a differentiated way in long-term and short-term perspectives is put forward and empirically confirmed. This creates a scientific basis for improving the reliability and accuracy of state forecasting of socio-economic development and macroeconomic planning. It is theoretically substantiated and empirically confirmed that macroeconomic environment influence on the independence of the National bank of Ukraine through eight channels.
It is determined that the catalysts of the central bank's independence are the growth of currency stability and the reduction of the level of fiscal and debt 34 security, and its inhibitors are the extensive growth of the banking sector and foreign trade. A methodology for determining the role of central bank independence in the functioning of the banking system in conditions of financial instability based on a combination of logit-regression modeling and a generalized method of least squares with fixed effects is proposed. This allowed to reject the hypothesis of the preventive role of central bank independence in preventing financial crises, as well as to justify the impact of central bank independence on the parameters of the banking system in periods of instability. Methodological basis for determining the impact of the quality of state regulation of the economy on the level of central bank independence is carried out using panel regression modeling and involves grouping countries by the level of initial conditions of socio-political development. This allowed to substantiate the set of preconditions of maximizing the institutional role of the state in providing central bank independence, as well as to identify the most effective channels for influencing the quality of state regulation of the economy on central bank independence growth depending on national specifics.
Key words: central bank, independence, transparency, regulation, inflation, financial stability, bank, banking system, determinants, public authorities.
