In historiography of the Russian-Ukrainian war, interdisciplinary approaches dominate. Ukrainian scientists studied the prerequisites and causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the issue of its periodization, the principles of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine, its impact on the economy of these countries, on military policy and security policy in Europe. The combat path of individual Ukrainian military units and the volunteer movement were also studied. In the foreign historiography among Western scientists, we trace two narratives, which we tentatively label as pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian. In works with a pro-Ukrainian narrative, a methodological foundation is based on modern values of Western civilization, in particular ones connected with adherence to the norms of international law, also Moscow’s attempts to spread the concept of “Russian world” to neighboring states are emphasized. Publications with a pro-Russian narrative justify a return to the geopolitical tools of the past, including “zones of influence”. In turn, thematic historical-theoretical studies are focused mainly on semantic or axiological issues: substantiating a certain paradigm, optimal concepts and models, consistent periodization for producing narratives of different levels.
When it comes to historical sources on the Russian-Ukrainian war (2014–2018), their diversity is noted. A significant part of them has already been published and it is in a free access on electronic and paper media: official documents, memoirs, oral testimonies, journalistic works, etc. The influential newspaper The New York Times described Russian-Ukrainian war of the period 2014–2018 in details. Analyzing the thematic focus and content of The New York Times publications on the Russian-Ukrainian war in the period 2014–2018, we can distinguish two periods within the time frame of our research. The first period – March 2014 – February 2015 – is the time of active hostilities. During the second period – February 2015 – April 2018 – there is a transition to a positional war.
The New York Times also provided reviews of the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war in the period 2014–2018 and prognostications of its development by representatives of the intellectual and political elite. Their dominant opinion was that Putin’s Russia sought to replace the “hot phase” of the war in Donbas with a “cold peace” in a destructive way: the autonomy of Donbas, the legalization of separatists in the Verkhovna Rada and local self-government bodies. Having de facto occupied a part of Donbas, Russia turned this region into a military bridgehead for further subjugation of the whole Ukraine.
In The New York Times, the fastest ways to strengthen Ukraine were fruitfully discussed, i.e. effective and urgent directions of its political, economic and military reforms. The restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine was projected exclusively through the means of diplomacy. Therefore, a compromise project of extended self-government was sought for the reintegration of Donbas.
The expediency of strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities with Western weapons was discussed most passionately on the pages of the newspaper. In the “hawks” camp, the West was advised to equip Ukraine with the appropriate weapons that would deter Russia from aggression. For the “appeasementors”, arming Ukraine would only encourage the Russian Federation to defeat Ukraine in order to humiliate the West.
As for the analytical and prognostic assessment of the consequences for Ukraine and the world of Russian aggression against Ukraine, some forecasts stated that Russia will fight in Donbas for years in order to eliminate Ukraine’s chances of joining the EU and NATO. Others noted that Ukraine will not be the last stop for the Russian Federation, which may later create frozen conflicts in the Baltic states.
Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, Donbas, Russian aggression, Russian invasion, hybrid war, Donetsk, Luhansk, Ukraine, Armed Forces of Ukraine, armed forces of the Russian Federation, The New York Times.
