Ivashchenco . Singularity of consciousness in the structure of the transcendental self-foundation

The dissertation examines the transcendental theory of self-consciousness in aspect of connection between the transcendental self-foundation and the singularity and non-reflexivity of self-knowledge. Having examined paradoxes of the transcendental theory of self-consciousness, the author has proven that it is impossible to describe self-knowledge consistently in the context of the objective knowledge's verification model. The failure of such attempt is manifested also by Kant's transcendental deduction of self-consciousness, which cannot describe self-consciousness as singular and non-reflexive state of affairs, that is immediate existence of knowledge. The reason for that is an attempt to justify universality and ubiquity of the objective knowledge's verification model even if is based on the right initial propositions, notably that of impossibility to deduct self-consciousness from empirical objectiveness and of differentiation's and integration's simultaneity.