Azarkhin K. Ontological intentions of the consciousness: phenomenology and pragmatics

The dissertation is devoted to a timely problem of the consideration of the philosophy’s (regarded as a conscious and motivated activity) possibility conditions. Such a consideration is problematic due to the inclusion of both phenomenological theory of the consciousness’ intentionality and the pragmatist approach to the concept of truth into a single research. Dissertaion’s feature of novelty is the deduction of a specific concept of truth (truth as a kerygma, an addressed message), which is formulated in the course of a transcendental analysis of the consciousness with a minimal level of abstraction from the actual, personal way of human being. Current analysis problematizes, firstly, traditional pragmatist relativism concerning truth, which has to be somehow brought into line with the theory of a priori properties of the consciousness, and, secondly, obscurity of the real grounds and reasons for philosophizing. The kerygma-truth, unlike the usual New Age concept of truth, has such basic properties as its rootedness in the consciousness’ modus of credence (on the contrary to the Cartesian requirement of scientific doubt), its actualization in a factual communication experience and its thematizing the finitude of human life in a manner whatsoever. The research regards the place of ontology in the structure of the consciousness, considers lingual forms of the ontological intentions’ actualization, disserts possibility conditions of the ontological intention’s fulfillment and, eventually, raises a question about the ontological reception, i.e. not just theoretical admission but a vital internalization of knowledge. The concept of truth drawn out in this dissertation corresponds with the mentioned ontological reception.