The thesis dedicates itself to researching realist and antirealist paradigms of scientific truth in analytical philosophy and deflationist truth theories as representatives of those paradigms. The research defines the mythologemes of analytical philosophy, as well as possible variations in its conceptualization, based on stylistics, methodology, themes, and topology. The study of predicative truth is systematically articulated, from paradigm, to aspect, to interpretation.
The discussion between realism and antirealism supporters mostly took place in the first half of the 20th century and was connected to revolutionary achievements in physics and emergence of the instrumentalist paradigm of antirealism. Later on, the question of (anti)realism became associated with the problem of truth of scientific knowledge, not only by historians, but also in the context of analytic philosophy. The permanent substantiation of the debate around the realist and antirealist paradigms of truth arose as a result of scepticism about the assertion of the real existence of certain entities postulated by science that cannot be directly perceived.
Evidently, any version of realism declares the objective existence of certain entities (mental, moral, physical, etc.), depending on the nature of which one can outline metaphysical realism, naive realism, scientific realism, psychological realism, moral realism, etc. Consequently, both realist and antirealist paradigms imply the existence of two interrelated modes: ontological and epistemological. The ontological mode of realism, in its principle, confirms the real existence of objects represented in scientific theory, language, and consciousness. The epistemological mode of the paradigm of realism asserts that objects and phenomena should be able to be at least marginally perceived, so that statements about them can be considered either as true or as false.
The ontological mode of realism distinguishes a realist position from anti-realist representations in science based on an epistemic understanding of truth as a factual correspondence with a standard set of methods and conditions by which the facts can be described.
The analysis of the concept of meaning is also fundamental for the paradigm of antirealism. According to the antirealist theory of meaning and truth, the extensional must be analysed not in terms of the correspondence of the proposition to the state of affairs, but rather in epistemological terms. The fundamental idea of antirealism is that the meaning of the utterance is established by the fact that it is accepted as the condition of its truth, on the basis that it provides a confirmation of something substantiating the acceptance of the utterance. the conceptual-semantic differentiation of the concepts of truth, meaning, reference, etc.
Key words: paradigm, truth, inflationism, deflationism, rigid designator, possible world, analysis, counterfactual context, realism, antirealism.
