Kebuladze V. Conception of Experience in the Transcendental Phenomenology

The dissertation paper is devoted to the investigation of the intrinsic tendency of the transcendental phenomenology, which consists in its transformation from the philosophy of consciousness into the philosophy of experience. The phenomenology is represented as antimetaphysical project of transcendental empiricism, which combines the elements of the empiricism and classical transcendentalism and in this way overcomes the lacks and gaps of these philosophical doctrines. The transcendental phenomenology rejects the empirical naturalization of consciousness and psychologism as skeptical relativism, criticizes the empirical concepts of association and induction and creates the concept of the free variation in fantasy. At the same time the transcendental phenomenology is differ from the classical transcendentalism as far as it rejects the notion "thing-in-itself", overcomes the opposition of reason and sensitivity and acknowledges the possibility of the intellectual contemplation, material a priori and passive synthesis as well. The transition from the static to the genetic phenomenology is represented as above-mentioned transformation of the phenomenology from the philosophy of consciousness into the philosophy of experience. The paper is considering such characteristics of experience as intentionality, temporality, intersubjectivity and corporeity, which from the point of view of the transcendental phenomenology are the conditions of possibility of experience in general. The prepredicative level of experience, the passive synthesis and the language as constitutive element of experience are also analyzed.