The dissertation work is devoted to theoretical substantiation and development of methodological approaches and practical recommendations on optimization of customs regulation in international economic systems.
Initially, an international economic system consisting of a cumulative domestic and a cumulative foreign manufacturer supplying its products to the domestic market was selected for analysis. At the same time, a foreign manufacturer is facing domestic customs on the way to the domestic market.
It is substantiated that with the establishment of a specific customs tariff, the equilibrium of the Cournot quantity of production made by a domestic producer increases by a certain amount, and the corresponding quantity of production of a foreign producer is reduced, and twice by a larger amount. That is, the total volume of products on the domestic market is reduced by the same certain amount.
Equilibrium and optimization economic-mathematical models of interaction of IES participants are constructed and analyzed under the conditions of information symmetry and asymmetry, as well as when combining the interests of customs authorities with the interests of the aggregate domestic producer.
The author has proposed and justified the introduction of quotas not for export of goods, but for saturation of the domestic market. When setting such a quota, the cost of production of a domestic producer ceases to be significant. The optimal value of duty rates is reduced. This becomes especially noticeable with the high size of such a quota and the high cost of production of domestic producers.
The dependence of the equilibrium amount of production both in the domestic and foreign markets on the cost of production of the domestic manufacturer is established. At the same time, three intervals were allocated in each of the markets: a foreign manufacturer is uncompetitive; domestic and foreign manufacturers are competitive; domestic manufacturer is uncompetitive.
It was found that at low cost of production of a domestic manufacturer, as long as the foreign manufacturer is competitive in the domestic market, the creation of international integration does not change the price of products on the market or the size of the corresponding interval.
International integration is forcing a domestic manufacturer to worry about reducing the cost of its products, as it may soon become uncompetitive in its market.
By increasing the cost of production of a domestic manufacturer, it becomes uncompetitive, and in the domestic market there is only the production of a foreign manufacturer, the amount of which will be lower than in all previous situations, and constant. It is interesting, that in this case, there is a jump in the amount of production in the domestic market, ie a slight increase in the cost of production of the domestic manufacturer corresponds to a sharp change in the amount of production – "catastrophe" according to the terminology of the corresponding mathematical theory.
Domestic manufacturers do not benefit from international integration, since much earlier (with less value of their production costs) their competitiveness in their market comes, which may not be compensated by expanding their presence in' foreign markets.
The dependence of the equilibrium volume of production on both the domestic and foreign markets and prices on the cost of production of domestic producers is established.
